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ABSTRACT
The recent events of the Arab Spring uprisings have brought the issues of sovereignty, security,
and intervention to the forefront of international politics. Was the 2011 multilateral intervention
in Libya justified? Why have there not been any significant steps taken to conduct similar
operations in Syria? The two states represent a set of unique challenges for the international
community. Some states believe that foreign powers cannot intervene in domestic affairs of other
states. However, is the international community to disregard a humanitarian crisis in adherence
to the notion of inviolable national sovereignty? If the national sovereignty of one state seems to
pose a threat to the national security objectives of another state, should national sovereignty be
infringed? The objectives of this paper will be to address the changing concept of sovereignty
and the challenges faced by policymakers in determining a universal definition and application
of the term. When, if ever, does the government lose sovereignty over its people? The paper will
focus on the relationship between sovereignty, security, the justifications for interventions and
the changing dynamic of the trio. The cases of Libya and Syria will be used as the main case
studies.
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On December 17, 2010, an act of self-immolation by Muhammad Buazizi, which could
have gone unnoticed by the international community, served as a catalyst for widespread protests
in Tunisia, and has now been considered as the symbolic start of the Arab Spring uprisings. The
protests, which originated in Tunisia, spread to neighboring countries and continue to have
significant ramifications for the region. The protests in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in procuring
the departure of their respective leaders. However, the situation in Libya escalated to a point
where an international coalition was forced to intervene in an attempt to speed up the resolution
of the conflict. Currently, the ongoing uprising in Syria has neared its two year anniversary, and
has, more or less, devolved into an escalating civil war. Yet, unlike in Libya, the international
community seems reluctant to intervene in Syria. The question arises of what motivates states to
intervene in the domestic affairs of another state. Is national sovereignty an inviolable notion
which inhibits any possibility of an intervention? If the concept of sovereignty has kept pace
with the changing international environment over the past several centuries, to what extent does
sovereignty still influence the interactions of modern nation-states? Has it become an outdated
concept for an increasingly globalized and interdependent world? This paper will use Libya and
Syria as case studies to attempt to analyze the links between sovereignty, intervention, and
security. It will argue that despite the globalization and the growing economic integration of
states, the notion of national sovereignty, although not absolute, still exercises significant
influence over the actions of state, a trend that is not about to dissipate in the near future.
A sixteenth-century Frenchman named Jean Bodin first coined the term of state
sovereignty (Snow 2011). As Krasner states, the term sovereignty has been used in several
different ways, ranging from domestic sovereignty, which refers “to the organization of public
authority within a state and the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority,” to
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interdependence sovereignty, which guides the ability of states to regulate what passes through
their borders. (2006). The concept of the Westphalian system of sovereignty has governed the
international arena since the 17th century (Gevans 2004). It is during this period that modern
nation states started to emerge and the legal basis for authority was institutionalized. More
recently, the principles of sovereignty have been preserved in the 20th century constructs, such as
the United Nations Charter. The sovereign equality of states is stated in Article 2.1 of the charter
and the notion of non-intervention is reiterated in Article 2.7 (Gevans 2004). According to basic
definitions of national sovereignty, each state reserves the right to exercise control and power
within its own territorial boundaries. At the same time, other states are expected to respect and
not infringe on these rights. The ideas of sovereignty are further developed and analyzed through
different schools of thought.
The realist paradigm argues that states are the only important actors across the world
stage. The latter school of thought adheres to the idea that states hold the sovereignty and
legitimacy to deal with domestic affairs, as well as to act as arbiters of interstate disputes. Snow
writes that the notions of sovereignty serve to guide behavior between state actors (2011).
Essentially, the realist approach most clearly described the bipolar power structure during the
Cold War. While more discussion is warranted to analyze the extent to which the realist
approach applied to the latter era, the basic principle of a state-centric approach still held true. In
other words, the United States and the Soviet Union acted as major players and sought to shape
the world according to their respective ideologies. The two entities focused on the assumption
that states hold the only power that can produce results, and so, they tried to shape the domestic
situations of foreign states in order to advance their own respective interests. National
sovereignty of other states suffered systematically at the hands of the two major powers and their
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quest for dominance. This is apparent in the U.S. involvement in Latin America and the Soviet
Union attempts to bring Easter Europe under its influence.
In this environment, no major entities existed, other than states, which could wield
enough influence or power to have a large enough impact on interstate relations. In the latter
world of geostrategic imperatives, states used all the resources within their power to guarantee
national interests through the use of force, even at the expense of national sovereignty of other
states. The most avid proponents of the realist theory were Morgenthau and Brzezinski. For
instance, in “The Grand Chessboard,” written in 1998 before the events of September 11,
Brzezinski paints a world where geostrategic priorities are based on different pivots which drive
national security policy. The latter work is based on the assumption of the dominance of nationstates and describes the relative importance of states in correlation to their geostrategic location.
Ever 9/11 acted as a fault line to produce a different environment where non-state actors, such as
terrorist networks, can pose real threats to states, it has been increasingly difficult for a strictly
realist approach to hold true (Snow 11). However, there still exists a relationship between the
realist approach and the types of intervention the theory regards as justified. In a sense, most
realists are opposed to a loose interpretation of national sovereignty (Hoffmann 2006). The latter
trend is in accordance with a belief that strictly national security interests should shape foreign
policy. Thus, events such as stringent human rights violations perpetrated by the state against its
own citizens do not merit an intervention, since these internal conflicts do not pose a vital threat
to national security interests.
According to the realist ideology, interventions, especially the ones involving the use of
the military, cannot be acceptable. Unless otherwise noted, the term intervention is used loosely
to encompass any indirect or direct means a state can use to influence the domestic affairs of a
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foreign state. As mentioned earlier, the only exception that the realist theory concedes can act as
a justifiable reason for intervention is the protection of vital and essential national security
objectives (Hoffmann 2006). In other words, if the protection of vital national security interests
necessitates a military intervention, such infringement on the national sovereignty of the other
state is justified.
Realists present two main arguments against a loose utilization of military interventions
(Hoffmann 2006). The first point rests on the assumption of legal terms. The principle of
national sovereignty acts as the “cornerstone of the post-Westphalian world order,” the
infringement of which threatens to undermine the stability of the intervening state as well as the
state of focus (Hoffmann 2006). This principle can be grasped by a comment made in 1999 by
China's then Foreign Minister, Tang JiaxuanThe, in response to the Kosovo intervention
(Crossette 1999). He warned that disregarding national sovereignty of other states and the right
of noninterference would “wreck havoc” on the world (Crossette 1999). As such, some
proponents highlight the sanctity of national sovereignty, and aver that a state is the precondition
of order and focus of social identity. Thus, a state that would choose to intervene on lesser causes
other than a direct national security threat, would serve to undermine the world order for an
insufficient excuse. The second point focuses on the political aspect. An unnecessary
intervention would risk “over commitment,” would detrimentally affect “relations with other
government, [and would] lead to an erosion of domestic support” (Hoffmann 2006). According
to the latter ideology, states do not need “human rights or humanitarian arguments to justify their
interventions” as that would constitute an insufficient threat to national security interests
(Hoffmann 2006). However, this argument for nonintervention seems inconclusive.
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In an increasingly interdependent and globalized world, it is becoming less and less
politically viable for states to ignore the internal actions and activities of foreign states. Recent
events illustrate that the world has moved away from the absolute principles of sovereignty,
assuming that the international system was ever at such a juncture. The latter trend can become
more apparent in analyzing the cases for or the arguments against the interventions in Lybia and
Syria.
Almost two decades ago, Tang Jiaxuan criticized the arguments that gave precedence to
human rights over sovereignty (Crossette 1999). The Chinese government still adheres to that
view of noninterference. However, while China is currently blocking any effort in the Security
Council to interfere in Syria, China simply abstained and did not veto Resolution 1973 which
authorized a no-fly zone over Libya. The subsequent intervention carried out by the international
coalition in Libya was one that utilized pooled military capabilities of the participating members
of the coalition (Cohen 2011). Thus, states seemingly violated the national sovereignty of Libya
by doing so. However, upon closer inspection, the latter statement seems inaccurate, a view that
will be further expounded on later in the discussion. As to Syria, the current discussion focusing
on the idea of intervention in Syria is not based so much on the issue of sovereignty as it is based
on other reservations.
What is true in the case of Syria is that when foreign states discuss the possibility of
intervening in Syria, they discuss how this might affect not the legitimacy of the Syrian
government, but the people of Syria. What has happened is that the Syrian government has lost
the legitimacy by committing unjustifiable acts against its own citizens. The initial concept of
national sovereignty, as it was established during the Peace of Westphalia, gave sovereignty to
the government. In today’s democracies, governments are elected by the people and so, it should
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follow that the legitimacy endowed on a secondary entity, the government, should in fact remain
with the source, the people. Most analysts agree that there has been a shift towards the
acceptance of the idea that it is the people who ultimately hold the national sovereignty of a state
(Snow 2011). While the latter principle might seem a little simplified, the underlying principle
holds true; which is that governments can no longer continue to retain legitimacy and act as the
representatives of national sovereignty without being accountable to their people. In other words,
by merely existing, governments do not hold the legitimacy to be the arbiters of sovereignty.
Since a government can lose its privilege as the keeper of national sovereignty, it follows that
foreign states would not automatically be infringing on another state by going against the
government of that state.
From one perspective it can be argued that national sovereignty is never even infringed
by an intervention in these cases. This case can be argued in instances where the acting
government commits actions that discredit its legitimacy and power, thus stripping itself of the
role of holding national sovereignty. In democratically elected governments, government
officials only retain power as long as the citizens accord them legitimacy. In effect, it is the
people who are the originators of national sovereignty. The latter concept becomes clearer in
analyzing the situations in Libya and Syria. Faced with an uprising that it was unable to halt, the
government of Libya resorted to extreme measures and threats to repress its populace. It was
during this frustration that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Lybia vowed to go “house by house” to
track down and kill protesters (Fahim 2011). Protests which had start in February, 2011 had
escalated to such a level of violence by March 22, that the international community feared that
Qaddafi would actually carry out the threat against Benghazi (Fahim 2011). Thus, by waging war
against its citizens, the government of Libya lost legitimacy with Libyans as well as most of the
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international community. Kofi Annan’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture in Oslo that “the sovereignty
of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights” seemed to
come true in Libya (2004). However, since it can be argued that at the time of the intervention,
the Qaddafi government did not hold the mandate for national sovereignty, the intervention
succeeded in curbing current and potential human rights violations in a state without quite
infringing on Libya’s sovereignty. The importance of sovereignty can be gauged from the type of
the intervention.
The intervention in Libya was supported by a strong United Nations Security Council
mandate, the support of the Arab League, and willingness of states to commit resources to Libya.
However, the intervention stopped short of deploying ground troops in the region. It can be
accurately argued that the ground troops were not deployed due to the reluctance of states to get
unnecessarily involved in Libya. Cultural and historic implications also added another dimension
to the viability of a more direct military intervention than a no-fly zone. While the latter issue
merits its own in depth analysis, the basic principle is that while the international community
interfered in Libya, it sought out a broad support base and the legitimacy of the United Nations.
The latter fact illustrated the importance states allocated to perceptions of Libya’s national
sovereignty. It was symbolic in that the participating member states of the coalition sought to
make sure that the sovereignty of the Libyan people would be upheld. They wanted to minimize
the possibility that the intervention would be construed as a small group of states seeking to
advance their own national interests (Hoffmann 2006).
Thus, the national sovereignty concept itself is inviolable, but the governments that hold
them are not. A government can lose the privilege of representing the national sovereignty of a
state. It follows from this argument that the Syrian government of al-Assad does not hold
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national sovereignty and so, undertaking measures to undermine the current Syrian government
does not in itself constitute a breach of Syrian sovereignty.
At the same time, the latter argument is not conclusive. Assuming that the government in
Syria has lost legitimacy and the Syrian people hold the national sovereignty of Syria in their
hands, it is unclear as to how one is to judge what the Syrian people want. In Libya, it was fairly
clear as to what the people of Libya sought to accomplish and what they asked of foreign states.
In Syria, the situation is different, since there exists no unified body to speak for Syrians.
Assuming that the Syrian people would like foreign aid, what type of foreign aid are they
seeking? The situation on the ground in Syria remains too complicated for simplification, but
assuming that the Syrian opposition were to unite and ask for a no-fly zone, would they be able
to achieve it? On the other hand, if the Syrian people were to clearly and unanimously articulate
that they are not seeking any international involvement, any state that does so would be
infringing on Syria’s national sovereignty. However, such an alternative is near impossible due
to the foreign involvement from such states as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, etc (BBC
News 2012). What remain are an atmosphere of disunity and the presence of multiple actors that
strive for different goals (Abrams 2012). To try to differentiate where sovereignty stops and
national security interests begin proves near impossible to clearly demarcate. Given the
geostrategic importance of Syria and an already high involvement of both state and non-state
actors, situation in Syria appears more complicated than the uprising in Libya. The nature of
ambiguous sovereignty borders can be apparent in the fact that the supposed internal conflict in
Syria has not remained confined within the territorial borders of Syria’s national sovereignty
(The Economist 2012).
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For instance, Turkey and Syria have exchanged fire near the Turkey-Syria border (The
Economist 2012). Neither Turkey nor Syria seeks an overt conflict. Since Turkey is a member
state of NATO, any threat leveled at Turkey would be a threat leveled at all the member states of
NATO. It is clear that Syria in no way seeks to even intentionally provoke Turkey. But suppose
that the Syrian conflict escalated to a point where the internal conflict in Syria posed a vital
security threat to Turkey. Suppose the separatist elements from Syria spilled over to Turkey and
incited the Kurds to stage uprisings in Turkey, thus undermining the unity and well-being of one
of the most stable secular Islamic states in the region. Then suppose that Turkey had both the
willingness and the military capability to undertake a direct intervention in order to neutralize the
threat. Would Turkey be justified in infringing on the national sovereignty of Syria and its
people? Would national security interests of one state trump the national sovereignty
prerogatives of another? The same escalating trend of events can be envisaged for either of
Syria’s neighbors, especially with Israel. However, as is the case with the inviolability of
national sovereignty, there exist no absolutes.
The basic principle that one must draw is that there does not exist and there should not
exist a blueprint of agenda that can be applied to diverse situations with the same consistency as
if the unique problems and complexities were identical. The United States believed that Iraq
posed a vital threat to national security interests and thus it undertook a military intervention for
the protection of national security interests. As the event pertains to this discussion, whether the
United States was right or wrong in pursuing the latter course of action is irrelevant. The
underlying principle is that national security prerogatives of one state trumped the national
sovereignty of another state. In other instances, where interventions could potentially have been
justified, states failed to take any action. The clearest examples that spring up are the cases of
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Rwanda, Kosovo, and Somalia. This is coupled with the perceived inconsistency over the lack of
intervention in Syria as opposed to the one in Libya.
It is precisely the inconsistency and selectivity of interventions that the realist paradigm
opposes (Hoffmann 2006). In a world of limited resources, states cannot undertake every effort
that might necessitate intervention. In light of the finite number of resources, the adherents of
realism argue that the humanitarian justifications for interventions be disregarded, like Libya for
example. They seem to argue that the since states cannot maintain a consistent record, it would
be better to ignore the problems of humanitarian crises altogether. So what if their assessment is
accurate? Every action has drawbacks, and in the case for intervention on strictly humanitarian
concerns, the benefits outweigh the costs.
The escalating violence in Libya did not pose a vital threat to U.S. national security
interests. A vital threat in this instance is assumed to mean an imminent and direct threat aimed
at undermining the U.S. national security. While the regional implications of the internal
outcome in Libya would have far reaching consequences for the rest of the world, it is likely that
no single state felt threatened by the escalating violence in Libya. However, even in light of the
lack of underlying national security concerns, foreign states formed a coalition and undertook a
direct military intervention in Libya by utilizing a no-fly zone (United Nations 2011). The fact
that no state particularly sought to get involved in Libya is inherent in the previously discussed
measures states took to ensure the legitimacy and the transparency of the intervention. As stated
before, international ground troops were not deployed in Libya, an action that might have led
some actors to incorrectly assume that the foreign states were attempting to shape events in
Libya vis à vis their own national security interests. While some states, “particularly among
developing countries,… saw it as a ploy by Western powers to meddle in the internal affairs of
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weaker countries,” such scrutiny does not seem likely in the case of Libya (Bolopion 2011).
Thus, it could be successfully argued that the principal reason for the intervention was the
humanitarian crisis unfolding in Libya. This raises a question of whether a response to human
rights violations in Libya was a responsibility of foreign states or whether such an intervention
was voluntary and as easily withdrawn as the strength it took to undertake it.
In 2005, as a response to “failure by states in the 1990s to protect civilian populations in
conflict area,” the United Nations established a notion of the Responsibility to Protect, or RtP
(Desker 2011). Particularly affected by the human rights violations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
RtP authorized the use of force in four specific situations: genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and ethnic cleansing (Desker 2011). By some accounts, the intervention in Libya
represented the first utilization of RtP as a basis for intervention. Critics might point out that,
even though RtP seems straightforward, the latter concept still contains ambiguities that can be
construed to suit the interests of individual states. Samantha Power alludes to the situation in
Rwanda, in which the United States seemed reluctant to classify the conflict in Rwanda as
genocide in order to avoid the political implications of such a classification (2007). Thus, even
though RtP should have theoretically urged states to intervene in response to gross violations of
human rights, nothing was done to avert or contain the disaster. However, just because
interventions cannot alleviate all the conditions of humanitarian crises in the world, does not
imply that states should not respond to human rights violations in the states that they are able to
do so. While the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy did state that the reaction of the
international community and of Europe would remain the same, as compared to the reaction in
Libya, such consistency seems highly unlikely (Rettman 2011). Furthermore, the Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty highlights the disagreement that
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still exists more than a decade after its publication as to “whether, if there is a right of
intervention, how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority” (2001). One
might assume that the lack of overarching consensus would undermine the notion that
interventions represent viable options to tackle human rights violations. However, that is not the
case.
For some, humanitarian interventions constitute an “alarming breach” of an international
state order (ICISS 2001) that violate the principles of the inviolability of the sovereignty of
states. For others, “new activism has been the overdue internationalization of the human
conscience” (ICISS 2001). While there still remain unresolved issues of whether direct
interventions can be efficient and successful, it is true that the concept of humanitarian
intervention will remain. This paper has sought to analyze links between sovereignty, national
security interests, and interventions. While the topic has only been lightly broached, one can still
draw some overarching principles.
Deker stated that the “traditional lines of sovereignty” would “be blurred as problems of
one state became “concern of neighboring states” (2011). The recent uprisings of the Arab
Spring demonstrate that it is no longer feasible to assume that intrastate conflicts will remain
confined by the national sovereignty jurisdictions defined by territorial boundaries. However, the
notions of sovereignty have also changed in an effort to adapt to the changing environment of
modern nation states. Thus, if it becomes necessary to safeguard basic human rights principles,
states should be willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. While the latter
intervention might not be classified as a vital national security interest, this inclusion does not
negate its importance. Furthermore, since national sovereignty essentially resides with the
people, states would not necessarily be violating the sovereignty of other states by taking actions
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in opposition to the government of the state. Granted the latter concepts are more complex and
require a deeper analysis for a more comprehensive understanding, the basic principle of
humanitarian intervention still remains. The latter argument does not intend to be taken as a
blueprint, but rather as an overarching principle that can be used and applied on a case by case
basis.
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